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INTRODUCTION 
 
Figure 1: Map of Hong Kong 
 
In the early 1970s, Hong Kong gave every outward appearance of prosperity. The Hong 
Kong Stock Exchange’s Hang Seng Index rose from 59 points in 1967 to 1,775 points in March 
1973, in what Robert Cottrell calls “one of the greatest ‘bull runs’ in world stock-market 
history.”1 The Connaught Centre, Hong Kong’s first skyscraper to rival Manhattan proportions, 
became the tallest building in Asia; and the Ten-Year Housing program, announced by the Hong 
Kong Government in 1972, promised to provide quality housing for 1.8 million people in 10 
years. 2 Under British Crown rule, starting in 1841, Hong Kong had developed from a sparsely 
                                                          
1 Cottrell, Robert. The End of Hong Kong: The Secret Diplomacy of Imperial Retreat. London: John 
Murray (Publishers) Ltd., 1993. 32 
2 Ibid, 32 
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populated set of islands to an industrialized hub of global commerce. Against such a backdrop, 
Hong Kong offered enormous economic advantages to both Britain and China and signals 
pointed to a prosperous neon-lit future.  
However, these outward growth measures concealed public and economic uncertainty 
about Hong Kong’s future as an agreement leasing the New Territories, or 92% of the 
geographic land of Hong Kong, to the British expired on July 1, 1997. In the early 1970s, neither 
Britain nor China had spoken openly about how the 1997 deadline would impact Hong Kong, 
which led international investors and the Hong Kong people to demand assurances about the 
preservation of Hong Kong’s internationally accepted political and economic institutions under 
British administration. Pressure from international investors led Britain to open a negotiation 
with China lasting from 1979-1984 concerned with resolving the question of Hong Kong’s future 
status after 1997. The following pages outline the details of this negotiation and explore why the 
British ultimately gave up their legal claims to Hong Kong and withdrew from the former 
colony.   
Britain originally acquired Hong Kong from the Qing dynasty in three parts via three 
separate legal agreements. In 1842, the Treaty of Nanking ceded Hong Kong Island to Britain “in 
perpetuity” after Britain’s defeat of China in the First Opium War (1839-42).3 In 1860, the 
Kowloon Peninsula was added on the same legal terms by the Convention of Peking following 
the Second Opium War (1856-60). On July 1, 1898, British Prime Minister, Sir Claude 
                                                          
Hong Kong Housing Authority. “Public Housing Development.” Housing Department, The Government 
of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region. London. Accessed 01/11/17. 
https://www.housingauthority.gov.hk/linear/en/about-us/public-housing-heritage/public-housing-
development/index.html. 
3 Cradock, Percy. Experiences of China. London: John Murray, 1994. 162 
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MacDonald, and Chinese representative, Li Hongzhang, signed a subsequent treaty leasing the 
remainder of present day Hong Kong, the New Territories, to Britain for ninety-nine years. The 
New Territories constituted 92 per cent of the land of Hong Kong and bordered Mainland China.  
Unlike the international agreements that ceded Hong Kong Island and the Kowloon 
Peninsula to the British indefinitely, Britain’s possession of the New Territories had a fixed 
expiration date of July 1, 1997. In his memoir, Experiences of China, Sir Percy Cradock explains 
that this key difference arose after MacDonald ignored recommendations to negotiate a cession 
of territory instead of a lease of the territory. MacDonald chose to accept a lease to avoid, as the 
Chinese argued, other powers like Germany and Russia seeking a conversion of their leases into 
permanently ceded territories. Convinced by China’s request, MacDonald accepted China’s 
ninety-nine-year lease arrangement of the New Territories and signed the second Convention of 
Peking.4 However, when the lease of the New Territories expired in 1997, the Hong Kong 
Governor’s right to administer the New territories would also cease—as agreed by an Order in 
Council of 1898—and China would recover sovereignty of the New Territories.5 
In 1979, as the expiration date of the New Territories Lease approached, Britain opened 
discussions with China on Hong Kong’s future. While Britain had no legal right to the New 
Territories after 1997, international law ceded Hong Kong Island and the Kowloon Peninsula to 
Britain indefinitely. Therefore, under international law the British had a permanent place in 
Hong Kong. However, in the Sino-British Joint Declaration signed in 1984, Britain ultimately 
relinquished their sovereign claims to Hong Kong.  
                                                          
4 Cradock, Experiences of China. 162 
5 MacLehose to Thatcher, 23 July 1982, FCO 21/2214, The British National Archives (hereafter TNA). 
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This thesis explores the reasons why Britain changed their policy from maintaining 
sovereignty and administration of Hong Kong after 1997, to relinquishing sovereignty in 1984 
and permanently leaving Hong Kong. Among the primary reasons for Britain’s concession and 
withdrawal was the expiration of the New Territories lease, concerns about maintaining Hong 
Kong’s economic vitality and the fact that China ultimately had the strongest negotiating 
position because they were committed to reclaiming Hong Kong at any cost. Under these 
constraints, Britain achieved the best deal they could and accusations in the existing literature of 
British cowardice or betrayal are neither born out nor justified.  
The pages that follow draw inspiration from the rich debates in the existing literature, which 
broadly fall under two camps. Orthodox pro-Chinese narratives reject the legitimacy of British 
occupation in Hong Kong claiming it was based on to the imposition of illegal and unequal 
treaties. As identified by Joseph Cheng in his work, Hong Kong in Search of a Future, pro-
Chinese narratives view the return of Hong Kong to China as a matter of justice following a 
century of colonial subjugation and exploitation.6 On the other hand, the British perspective 
begins the history of Hong Kong at the point of British arrival in 1841. It focuses chiefly on the 
                                                          
6 Cheng, Joseph. Hong Kong in Search of a Future. Hong Kong ; New York: Oxford University Press, 
1984. 45-74.  
For another account exploring the pro-Chinese narrative, see the article The Discourse of Unequal 
Treaties in Modern China by Dong Wang, which explores the Chinese narrative that the three treaties 
ceding and leasing Hong Kong to Britain were invalid and exploitative. Wang, Dong. "The Discourse of 
Unequal Treaties in Modern China." Pacific Affairs 76, no. 3 (2003): 399-425. 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/40023820. (404) 
 
For more information about the legal context around the debate on Hong Kong self-determination versus 
reunification with China see Antonio Cassese’s work Self-determination of peoples: a legal reappraisal. 
Cassese traces how the political idea of self-determination became a legal standard and explores in one 
paragraph the removal of Hong Kong from the list of non-self-governing territories in 1972. He also 
explores decisions made by the UN in normalizing self-determination as a legal standard and the 
precedents, debates and controversies such decisions led to. Cassese, Antonio. Self-Determination of 
Peoples : A Legal Reappraisal. New York, NY ; Cambridge: Cambridge University Press :, 1995. 
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contribution of British elites—colonial administrators, businessmen, and missionaries—in Hong 
Kong’s evolution from a “barren island” 7 to a global city. Furthermore, there are several 
accounts of Hong Kong history written from the so-called Colonial School including: E.J. Eitel’s 
Europe in China : The history of Hongkong from the beginning to the year 1882, and Frank 
Welsh’s, A History of Hong Kong. Accounts in the Colonial School begin their histories of Hong 
Kong in the economically advantageous days of trade at Canton, moving to the opium wars and 
into the “founding” of Hong Kong.8 The idea of the “founding” of Hong Kong is particularly 
controversial in these texts because it assumes the legality of Hong Kong’s separation from the 
Mainland and the creation of Hong Kong as its own separate state under British administration, 
which China has consistently rejected.   
While these works offer important contextual background on the competing historical 
interests at stake in the Sino-British negotiations, this thesis draws most of its inspiration from 
memoirs, auto-biographies and biographies of the British officials who participated in the 
negotiations, as well as journalistic accounts such a Robert Cottrell’s The End of Hong Kong: 
The Secret Diplomacy of Imperial Retreat, Mark Roberti’s The Fall of Hong Kong: China’s 
                                                          
7Cradock, Experiences of China, 162  
8 Eitel, Ernest John. Europe in China; the History of Hongkong from the Beginning to the Year 1882. 
Ch’eng-wen Pub. Co., 1968. 
 
Welsh, Frank. A History of Hong Kong. London: HarperCollins, 1997. 
 
The British perspective also encompasses the more niche approach of critical discourse historiography 
pioneered by John Flowerdew in his two texts: The Final Years of British Hong Kong: The Discourse of 
Colonial Withdrawal, and Critical discourse Analysis in Historiography: The Case of Hong Kong's 
Evolving Political Identity. Flowerdew critically reviews the role of British elites in Hong Kong, with 
special attention given to how Hong Kong Governors employed certain dialogues to present. Flowerdew, 
John. Critical Discourse Analysis in Historiography : The Case of Hong Kong’s Evolving Political 
Identity. Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire ; New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012. And, Flowerdew, 
John. The Final Years of British Hong Kong : The Discourse of Colonial Withdrawal. New York: St. 
Martin’s Press, 1998. 
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Triumph and Britain’s Betrayal that rely on personal experiences and newspapers written about 
the negotiations.9 Given that the negotiations between Britain and China were secret and 
confidential, accounts from British officials such as Sir Percy Cradock’s Experiences of China 
offers a unique, though limited, insight into the dynamics at stake from the British side, while 
journalistic accounts lack evidence from British government records to substantiate their 
arguments about the British government’s policy.  
My thesis differs from the existing literature and makes an important contribution to the 
debate by drawing on records of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) found at the 
British Natioanl Archives (TNA) and that were made available to the public in 2015. I explore 
the confidential documents of the FCO on the Future of Hong Kong and also draw on Margaret 
Thatcher’s Prime Minister’s Office and personal records from the Margaret Thatcher Foundation 
digital archive to explore issues of policy, sovereignty and power in national diplomacy. My 
thesis highlights some of the key debates that emerged as British officials developed a policy to 
recommend to Thatcher and responded to some of the unexpected constraints China placed on 
the negotiations. I use debates within the FCO to chart the strength of Britain’s negotiating hand 
and make inferences about changes to British goals and bargaining claims over the course of the 
negotiations. 
The following pages are organized thematically and chronologically. Chapter one focuses 
on the prelude to the formal negotiations between Britain and China and argues that pressure 
                                                          
9 Cottrell, The End of Hong Kong: The Secret Diplomacy of Imperial Retreat.  
 
Roberti, Mark. The Fall of Hong Kong : China’s Triumph and Britain’s Betrayal. New York: John Wiley 
& Sons, 1996. 
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from British corporations, institutional investors, and other economic stakeholders in Hong Kong 
convinced British officials that the question of Hong Kong’s future with China needed to be 
raised as early as 1979.  It explores the reasons why British officials responded to investor fears 
and thought that they held strong legal and economic arguments to advocate for continued 
British administration of Hong Kong after 1997. Chapter two begins with Margaret Thatcher’s 
state visit to China in 1982 to open formal negotiations with China. It underscores how Britain’s 
miscalculations concerning the strength of their legal and economic arguments led Britain to 
change their policy on Hong Kong and eventually cede sovereignty of territory otherwise 
guaranteed to them under international law. Chapter three begins after Britain signaled that they 
would make a concession on Hong Kong sovereignty to China and continues through 1984 when 
the signing of the Sino-British Joint Declaration ended negotiations on Hong Kong’s future. 
Here, I offer a rejoinder to the existing literature that argues that British policy throughout the 
negotiations did an injustice to the Hong Kong people by not representing their interests or 
perspective during the bilateral negotiation process with China. To the contrary, I argue that the 
People Republic of China’s (PRC) insistence that the Hong Kong people were and always will 
be part of China undermined any British attempts to advocate on behalf of the Hong Kong 
people in a direct way.  
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CHAPTER I: 
 
THE PRELUDE TO NEGOTIATIONS, BRITAIN’S STRONG HAND 
Hong Kong, 1979-1981 
 
Britain’s three-part acquisition of Hong Kong in the mid-nineteenth century included the 
cession of Hong Kong Island and the Kowloon Peninsula as well as a ninety-nine-year lease of 
the New Territories set to expire on July 1,1997. On this date, China would technically resume 
sovereignty of the New Territories. The eventual handover of one-third of Hong Kong presented 
the possibility of a change in administration that could disrupt the territory’s existing legal 
frameworks, internationally accepted currency and capitalist free-market economy. Due to the 
unusual political and economic uncertainty the lease created, certain investors threatened to 
curtail investments in Hong Kong if Britain and China did not offer assurances about the 
territory’s future. According to investors, economic uncertainty was only set to increase as the 
expiration of the New Territories lease approached.  
In the early 1970s, it was still unclear to Britain what would happen to Hong Kong 
politically and economically after 1997 and who would administer the territory. The treaties that 
ceded Hong Kong Island and the Kowloon Peninsula to Britain bestowed indefinite legal rights 
of ownership upon them that were recognized in international law. Furthermore, British 
administration of Hong Kong had led the colony’s economic development from a sparsely 
populated set of islands to an industrialized hub of global commerce.10 As China benefited from 
a prosperous Hong Kong, Britain determined that China stood more to lose economically if 
administration of the colony changed hands.11 Based on these legal and economic assumptions, 
                                                          
10 Macintyre, Thomas. "Impact of the Sino-British Agreement on Hong Kong's Economic Future," Journal of 
Comparative Business and Capital Market Law 7, no. 2 (June 1985): 197-216 
11 Hong Kong and General Department to FCO, 7 May 1982, TNA, FCO21/2214. 
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British officials determined that kickstarting informal discussions with China, over eighteen 
years before the scheduled 1997 handover of the New Territories, offered the best solution to 
maintain British administration of the whole of Hong Kong after July 1,1997.  
This chapter thus argues that pressure from British corporations, institutional investors, 
and other economic stakeholders in Hong Kong convinced British officials that the question of 
Hong Kong’s future with China needed to be raised as early as 1979.  Moreover, British officials 
were sympathetic to petitions seeking assurances on Hong Kong’s future because they 
determined that they held a strong bargaining position both legally and economically.  
I  Economic Prosperity through British Administration 
British administration of Hong Kong provided a robust framework for Hong Kong’s 
economic development. When Britain first acquired Hong Kong, Lord Palmerston described the 
colony as a “barren island with hardly a house upon it.”12 However, Britain’s introduction of an 
internationally accepted currency, continuity and predictability in law and administration, and 
established trading arrangements promoted economic confidence and growth.13 For the British, 
Hong Kong’s prosperity as a Financial Center depended on its ability to attract international 
deposits and on the existence of a convertible currency that was internationally acceptable. Both 
factors depended on the existence of well-established law, whose practices were internationally 
understood and accepted, as well as on domestic and international confidence in the 
predictability and consistency of administration and taxation.14 British administration guaranteed 
both conditions and helped Hong Kong develop into one of the world’s leading financial hubs. 
                                                          
12 Cradock, Experiences of China. 164 
13 MacLehose to Youde and FCO, 8 April 1982, TNA, FCO 21/2212. 
14 Davies to McDonald and Clift, 21 April 1982, TNA, FCO 21/2212. 
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From the British perspective, Hong Kong’s future economic prosperity thus depended on 
continued British administration. 
In addition, British diplomats believed China’s economic interest in a prosperous Hong 
Kong provided a compelling reason for China to support continued British administration. Since 
coming to power in 1949, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) realized Hong Kong’s 
economic value and maintained a pragmatic relationship with the British colonial 
administration.15  Hong Kong refinanced several of China’s loans following the failed policies of 
the Great Leap Forward and the Cultural Revolution and saved China from economic collapse. 
Furthermore, throughout the 1960s, the PRC earned almost half of its hard currency from selling 
food and water to Hong Kong.16 By 1981, one third of China’s foreign exchange—amounting to 
$6 billion dollars— came from Hong Kong, and the Chinese received an income of $4 billion a 
year from the British territory.17 Britain, therefore, reasoned that continued British administration 
was in China’s best economic interest and thought the Chinese would find this argument 
convincing.  
Up until the early 1970s, China left the question of Hong Kong’s future alone and gave 
Britain no reason to suspect a change in stance. For example, in 1971, the PRC issued a vague 
assurance to Hong Kong and Britain that “no moves would be made against Hong Kong or 
Taiwan for a long time to come.”18 Despite the obvious ambiguity behind the term “long time to 
come,” British diplomats concluded that China did not appear to be preparing any significant 
                                                          
15 Carroll, John M. A Concise History of Hong Kong. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2007. 174  
16 Ibid, 174  
17 Visit by Hong Kong Factory Owners Association delegation to Peking, 24 November 1982, TNA, FCO 
21/220. 
Hong Kong and General Department to FCO, 7 May 1982, TNA, FCO21/2214. 
18 The Periscope, Soft Words from Peking, December 13 1971, TNA, FCO21/871. 
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moves over the question of Hong Kong’s future status after the expiration of New Territories 
lease.  
In 1972, just one year after China’s vague assurance, the PRC signaled a different line 
toward continued British administration of Hong Kong. In a letter written to the United Nations 
Special Committee on Decolonization by Huang Ha, the foreign minister of the PRC, China 
argued for the removal of Hong Kong and Macau from the list of countries on the United 
Nations’ decolonization agenda.19 This move sought to deny Hong Kong and Macau of the 
possibility of becoming a self-determined state. China reasoned that Hong Kong and Macau were 
“Chinese territory occupied by the British and Portuguese authorities” and that “questions of 
Hong Kong and Macau belong to the category of questions resulting from a series of unequal 
treaties left over by history, treaties which the imperialists imposed on China.”20 The letter 
announced China’s rejection of the three treaties that had ceded and leased Hong Kong to Britain 
and, therefore, challenged Britain’s legal claim to Hong Kong. China’s rejection of the treaties 
was founded on the notion that equal powers did not create the documents; rather, British 
imperialists exploited their power over a weakened Chinese state to seize territory for their 
colonial ends. The letter clearly outlined that, in China’s view, Hong Kong and Macau remained 
part of China even after they were ceded, which meant that they were not subjects for self-
determination but rather integral parts of Chinese territory that should be reinstated.  
                                                          
19 The formal name of the UN Special Committee on decolonization was The Special Committee on the 
Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to 
Colonial Countries and Peoples. As a UN entity, this committee was established in 1961 by the General 
Assembly and existed exclusively to deal with the issue of decolonization. The Special Committee 
annually reviewed a list of colonial Territories and made recommendations about how to mobilize public 
opinion in support of the decolonization process. For more information, visit 
https://www.un.org/en/decolonization/specialcommittee.shtml (accessed 03/19/18). 
 
20 Hua to the United Nations, 8 March 1972, UN Online Archives, A/AC.109/396 
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Despite the letter’s strong argument, Britain still believed that they had a more robust 
legal claim over Hong Kong. In response to China’s letter to the UN, Britain restated their 
position that China’s demands “in no way affect the legal status of Hong Kong.”21 The British 
argued that the treaty of Nanking and Convention of Peking indefinitely ceded Hong Kong 
Island and Kowloon to Britain under international law. The British operated under the 
assumption upheld by the United Nations that treaties, conventions and international agreements 
comprised an important part of international law. The two treaties represented legally binding 
agreements between Britain and China that could not be broken without Britain’s formal consent 
by way of an Act of Parliament. The legality of British sovereignty over Hong Kong Island and 
Kowloon was therefore not open for dispute. Thus, despite the message of China’s letter, 
Britain’s resolve to maintain administration over Hong Kong after 1997 did not weaken. Indeed, 
according to historian John Carroll, people in Hong Kong interpreted China’s stance in the letter 
as primarily a rhetorical maneuver and — along with the British — expected the PRC to 
continue to leave Hong Kong’s political status alone.22 
  The one treaty that had no future legal guarantees, however, was the ninety-nine-year 
New Territories lease that was set to expire in 1997. As the New Territories counted for 92% of 
the total land of Hong Kong, protecting British administration of the New territories was 
especially important to Britain. As later chapters reveal, British officials concluded that it was 
unviable to run the ceded territories without the New Territories due to the infrastructural 
interdependence and economic integration of the three areas. By the end of the 1970s, external 
pressure from economic actors and a growing sentiment of unease from the Hong Kong people 
                                                          
21 Cottrell, The End of Hong Kong. 33 
22 Carroll, A Concise History of Hong Kong. 174 
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meant that Britain could no longer ignore the growing political and economic uncertainty 
surrounding the question of Hong Kong’s future. The coming expiration date of the New 
Territories lease thus dictated the nature and timing of the negotiations on Hong Kong’s future. 
 
II  Responding to the Pressure of Economic Uncertainty  
While British diplomats did not initially feel threatened by China’s position on Hong 
Kong’s future, foreign investors and companies were not prepared to leave the question of Hong 
Kong’s future alone. The impending expiration date of the New Territories lease created an 
unusual climate for foreign investors and businesses. Specifically, the end of the lease created 
uncertainty around the status of foreign investments that only increased as the 1997 deadline 
approached. Investors and foreign businesses thus demanded that Britain obtain a greater set of 
assurances from China about Hong Kong’s future status to give them more investment 
confidence.  
As early as 1971, British-owned businesses in Hong Kong, such as Shell, sought 
reassurances on the colony’s future from Her Majesty’s Government (HMG). They indicated that 
Hong Kong’s uncertain political future could deter them from further investment in the colony. 
After Malcom MacDonald and Zhou En Lai met to discuss investment in Hong Kong in 1971, 
the Regional Director of Shell wrote to the political adviser to the Hong Kong Government, 
Arthur Maddocks, requesting assurances to invest. The British reply encouraged Shell to invest 
in Hong Kong, despite Zhou communicating to MacDonald that the long-term implications for 
British investment post-1997 were set to change.23 Britain’s response reveals both their desire to 
                                                          
23 Morgan to Maddocks, 3 December 1971, TNA, FCO 21/871. 
Maddocks to Morgan, 28 December 1971, TNA, FCO21/871. 
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quell economic uncertainty and their continued confidence that they would prevail in 
negotiations. 
Pressure from investors divided British officials who debated whether to raise the future 
status of Hong Kong with the Chinese or leave the impending expiration date alone. Some 
British policymakers questioned the likelihood of a sudden and significant loss of business 
confidence arising from uncertainty about the future of Hong Kong. The Planning Staff of the 
Foreign and Commonwealth Office argued that the buoyancy of Hong Kong’s economy would 
prevent uncertainty amounting to an economic or financial crisis.24 They suggested that while 
investors were concerned about Hong Kong’s future, the territory had much to offer 
economically and still attracted investors despite political tension. While big British-run 
companies in Hong Kong declared concern about their economic futures, the Planning Staff 
argued that they were not behaving as though disinvestment was about to begin.25 For example, 
the Planning Staff argued that if businesses thought that disinvestment was imminent, they would 
be trying to sell their companies in Hong Kong while “local Chinese entrepreneurs are 
aggressively extending their hold on the Hong Kong economy through takeover bids.”26 
However, certain companies like Swire and Jardine Matthews actually expanded their overseas 
interests in Hong Kong during this period, indicating that they foresaw a prosperous future in 
Hong Kong. Further, Hong Kong typically offered a short payback on investments. Some 
officials therefore concluded that any investment undertaken in 1985 would create profit before 
the lease was up. These points, in combination, led many officials to the conclusion that 
                                                          
24 Jay to Clift, 24 December 1981, TNA, FCO40 1291. 
25 Ibid. 
26 Ibid.  
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beginning conversations around Hong Kong’s future in the late 1970s to ease investor worry was 
premature and unnecessary.   
In the end, however, top British officials were sympathetic to the fears of investors, 
agreeing that economic uncertainty could lead to a meaningful loss of business confidence. The 
major turning point for this debate came in 1976 when Jimmy McGregor, director of the Hong 
Kong General Chamber of Commerce, warned that without assurances from the PRC 
government, investors would not make long-term investments in Hong Kong.27 Businesspersons 
were particularly concerned about the effect of the expiration of the individual land leases in 
Hong Kong that were all set to expire three days before the New Territories lease ended. Without 
guarantees that the leases could be extended, investors worried that the expiration of the New 
Territories lease would invalidate their property contracts.  
British officials were concerned that a falter in public confidence regarding Hong Kong’s 
future could lead to financial collapse and immigration pressures. Britain wanted to avoid Hong 
Kong people fleeing out of Hong Kong after the 1997 lease expired. In the early 1980s, the 
population of Hong Kong was 5 million and in March 1982, Lord Carrington wrote to Mrs. 
Thatcher of the “danger of them trying to get into Britain if things went wrong” as he did not see 
the option of a unilateral withdraw to be on the table28 British officials wanted an orderly 
transition after 1997 to avoid a panicked flight of Hong Kong residents moving away from Hong 
Kong. In response to this fear, Britain passed the The British Nationality Act of 1981 to abolish 
the 1948 definition of British citizenship and replace it with three categories: British citizenship, 
                                                          
27 Hong Kong Standard, 29 April 1976, referred to in Chan, Ming K, and John D Young. Precarious 
Balance : Hong Kong between China and Britain, 1842-1992. Armonk, N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe, 1994. 
28 Carrington to Thatcher, 9 March 1982, TNA, PREM 19/789.  
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citizenship of British dependent territories, and British overseas citizenship.29 Of these, only 
British citizenship provided the right to live in Britain, thus stripping Hong Kong people of the 
option to emigrate to Britain. 
The British government deemed these financial and immigration concerns severe enough to 
necessitate immediate negotiations with the Chinese to discuss arrangements that would 
hopefully re-establish confidence. Without such an arrangement, HMG feared that Hong Kong 
might not remain governable for long.30 British officials thus responded to pressure from 
economic actors to open negotiations with China with the aim to ease concern among investors 
and the Hong Kong people and avoid a possible immigration crisis.  
 
III  Testing an Indirect Negotiation Strategy with China  
Against a background of economic uncertainty and pressure from investors and 
businesspeople, British officials considered the agenda for Murray MacLehose’s visit to Beijing 
planned for late March 1979. MacLehose planned to discuss links between Hong Kong and 
Guangdong and the wider topic of Hong Kong’s role in China’s modernization. Yet, the primary 
concern for British officials was whether MacLehose should also raise the issue of Hong Kong’s 
future during his visit.  
Some British officials responded that Britain’s best strategy was leaving the expiration of 
the New Territories lease completely alone. MacLehose argued that by leaving issues such as the 
expiration of the Crown Land Leases “on the backburner,” weakening confidence in Hong Kong 
                                                          
29 The National Archives, “Citizenship 1906-2003.” National Archives. Accessed March 16, 2018. 
http://www.nationalarchives.gov.uk/pathways/citizenship/brave_new_world/citizenship4.htm. 
30 Carrington to Thatcher, 1981. TNA, FCO40 1291. 
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and a decline in economic performance would force the Chinese to talk.31 Similarly, a white 
paper issued by the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) entitled Options for Action to 
Deal with a Slide of Confidence or a Chinese Initiative on the Future of Hong Kong suggested 
that a collapse of the Hong Kong Dollar might shock the Chinese leadership enough to make 
them ready to discuss practical ways of bolstering confidence.32 As China stood to lose more 
than Britain economically, a solution of patient waiting offered Britain a way out of initiating the 
negotiation talks.33  
 In the end, however, British officials decided that MacLehose should raise the question of 
Hong Kong’s future with China. They argued that, as MacLehose would meet Chinese leader 
Deng Xiaoping in person, he had a unique opportunity to raise the question of Hong Kong’s 
future with the Chinese at the highest level. The second argument centered on the need to obtain 
clarification on the legal uncertainties around both the ability to renew Crown land leases in the 
New Territories after 1997 as well as the inability of the Hong Kong Government to grant new 
leases after this period.34 Because the normal duration of Hong Kong mortgages on Crown land 
was fifteen years, individuals hoping to purchase a lease after 1982 lacked security on  their 
investments.35 The prospect of  Crown land leases being contested  in Hong Kong courts after 
1997 particularly concerned FCO officals, who believed that there would be a rapid loss of 
confidence without a solution to the leases expiring.36   
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While there was a general sense that MacLehose’s visit represented a strategic 
opportunity for Britain to achieve greater assurances from the Chinese over Hong Kong’s future, 
Britain feared that a direct approach to the question could weaken Britain’s negotiating hand. 
The possibility of China preemptively rejecting Britain’s proposal to discuss Hong Kong 
especially concerned the Lord Privy Seal, Sir Humphrey Atkins. Atkins believed that giving the 
Chinese an extensive briefing of the legal problems connected with the expiration of the New 
Territories lease would lead the Chinese to turn down Britain’s strategy “on the spot.” 37 Atkins 
sought to avoid any tactic that China could interpret as Britain overstepping or trying to “bounce 
them into agreeing now to our staying on beyond 1997.” 38 Atkins thus called for an indirect 
approach to the negotiations on Hong Kong’s future to protect British interests later. British 
officials concluded that if they could convince the Chinese to agree to grant individual land 
leases beyond 1997, Britain could sustain confidence in Hong Kong and blur the 1997 
deadline.39 However, China argued that it would hold sovereignty over Hong Kong after-1997 
and that 1997 did represent an important deadline on Hong Kong’s future. They therefore 
rejected Britain’s request to grant land leases beyond 1997 after MacLehose’s visit and signaled 
that a more direct strategy from the British would be necessary for substantive talks.  
 
IV  China’s Demands 
MacLehose’s visit indirectly opened discussions on Hong Kong’s future between Britain 
and China and revealed the need for Britain to adopt a more direct negotiating strategy. 
Following MacLehose’s visit, the FCO strategically used visits to Beijing by British officials to 
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remind the PRC of the question of Hong Kong.40 Britain planned several official visits to China 
between British and Chinese officials from 1979-1982. The Chinese Premier Hua Guofeng 
visited London in 1979 and then invited Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher to reciprocate his 
visit to China in 1982. Thatcher’s visit to China would officially mark the beginning of direct 
negotiations with the Chinese. In addition, several British officials travelled to China in advance 
of Thatcher’s visit to prepare for the meeting. In January of 1982, Humphrey Atkins travelled to 
Beijing to meet with Premier Zhao Ziyang, and in April 1982, former Prime Minister, Edward 
Heath, travelled to China to meet with Deng Xiaoping and establish whether there had been any 
shifts in Chinese thinking since MacLehose’s visit.   
During his visit to Beijing in January 1982, Atkins learned that the PRC had an evolved 
policy for Hong Kong based on a commitment to Chinese sovereignty of the territory. China 
argued that while they had not changed their essential demand of recovering Hong Kong 
sovereignty, they did now recognize the problems posed by the expiration of the New Territories 
Lease as well as the need for it to be solved before 1997.41  Ziyang advised Atkins to consult 
Ye’s nine-point statement for Taiwan that was delivered in September 1981 as an indication of 
Chinese policy in advance of Thatcher’s September 1982 visit to China. The nine-point 
statement made Taiwan a Special Administrative Region (SAR) that would retain a high degree 
of autonomy, which involved allowing the continuance of Taiwan’s social and economic 
systems.  This declaration established the framework for “one country, two systems.”42 In the 
context of Hong Kong, this would mean that the Hong Kong people would be able to carry out 
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the administrative responsibilities of the territory with no help from the British and minimal 
oversight from the Chinese state. This remark signaled that China was thinking about Hong 
Kong vis-à-vis  their strategy for Taiwan; therefore, going into Thatcher’s 1982 meeting, China 
was open to Hong Kong being a special administrative territory, but  the question of Chinese 
sovereignty was not open for negotiation. 
However, China also said they wanted to see Hong Kong remain a free port and a 
commercial and financial center. China’s statement of this desire encouraged the British that 
their assessment of their strong economic leverage in the negotiations was correct. British 
officials believed that the Chinese would be sympathetic to allowing continued British 
administration of Hong Kong as this would guarantee Hong Kong’s economic prosperity and 
bolster the confidence of the general public and investors. In a report to Thatcher on the future of 
Hong Kong, Lord Carrington said that “I do not myself believe that [the Chinese] have yet fully 
grasped the ways in which confidence could be threatened or maintained.”43  
Although China signaled that sovereignty of Hong Kong was non-negotiable and that 
they wanted Hong Kong to remain economically viable, Britain saw China’s two goals as 
mutually exclusive. British officials determined that economic prosperity could only be achieved 
by preserving the current British administration. 44 Britain thought the only way these two 
seemingly irreconcilable goals could be achieve was through China assuming titular sovereignty 
wherein Britain would still maintain administrative control.  British officials thus determined that 
they still had a strong economic argument to support maintaining the status quo after 1997.  
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In April 1982, Edward Heath preemptively tested this strategy with the Chinese during 
his meeting with Deng Xiaoping. Deng’s remarks on sovereignty underlined that it would be an 
essential condition of progress for the Chinese. 45 However, Heath highlighted that Hong Kong’s 
economic prosperity advantaged China and argued that Britain should be allowed to still make 
contributions to Hong Kong’s prosperity after 1997.46 Heath said that Britain received nothing 
from Hong Kong and suggested that “Britain managed Hong Kong for the benefit of China and 
of mankind.”47  Though, both Heath and Deng discussed that Hong Kong’s position as a free port 
and a commercial and financial center were key to the territory’s continued prosperity, FCO 
officials concluded that, during Heath’s visit, the Chinese had shown a continued 
misunderstanding of the way the Hong Kong economy works and what investors will accept. 
Officials said, “We must try to explain to them how to avoid killing the goose that lays the 
golden eggs.”48 Despite China’s demand that Hong Kong sovereignty must revert to them after 
1997, British officials hoped that China would soften this demand after realizing how dependent 
Hong Kong’s prosperity was on British administration. 
V Thatcher Determines British Goals  
Following two years spent meeting with Chinese officials and developing an 
understanding of China’s demands, British officials still felt as though they held a strong 
bargaining hand. It was in this context that they discussed how Thatcher should approach the 
“difficult question” of Hong Kong’s future in her 1982 visit to China. British officials 
recommended that Thatcher focus on easing public and economic uncertainty and recommended 
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potential British goals to her.49 However, it was ultimately Thatcher who determined Britain’s 
negotiating strategy and goals during her meetings with the Chinese.  
Before her visit, Thatcher authorized Sir Percy Cradock to tell the Chinese government 
that the essential aim of the trip would be for the two sides to “have serious talks at official level 
about the future of Hong Kong.”50 The primary goal of the negotiations was to obtain “well 
before 1997, an assurance that separate British-administered Hong Kong would continue after 
the date, thereby preventing a slide in confidence.”51 For Britain, this represented the easiest 
solution as such an agreement only required an amendment to the Order in Council of 1898.52  
Thatcher was not ignorant to China’s demand on the necessity of ceding sovereignty of Hong 
Kong, but she believed in Britain’s strong legal and economic arguments. She, therefore, 
concluded that Britain “can offer no concession on sovereignty without a clear understanding 
that it is conditional on continuation of full powers of British administration.” 53 While the 
relinquishment of British sovereignty would require an Act of Parliament, there would be no 
further legal impediment (national or international)  if an agreement with the Chinese was 
reached which recognized Chinese sovereignty but confirmed full British control of domestic 
and external affairs in Hong Kong and that respected the period of notice of 15 years for a 
change.54 Britain thus kickstarted formal negotiations with the Chinese and held high 
expectations of a successful outcome that would assuage investor fears, restore public confidence 
and maintain British administration post-1997.  
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CHAPTER II 
CEDING SOVEREIGNTY, 1982 
In the lead up to Margaret Thatcher’s September 1982 visit to China, FCO officials 
briefed her about the probable need to cede sovereignty of Hong Kong following China’s 
messages to Humphrey Atkins and Edward Heath at the beginning of 1982. However, the 
question remained for Thatcher, why should Britain give up sovereignty of Hong Kong Island 
and the Kowloon Peninsula when international law ceded it to them indefinitely? Invigorated by 
her success in the Falklands War, Thatcher was not prepared to relinquish Britain’s legal claim to 
Hong Kong straight away.55 She aimed to maintain sovereignty over Hong Kong Island and 
Kowloon Peninsula and retain administration over the New Territories. Thatcher set about 
preparing a strong legal and economic argument that would defend Britain’s future in Hong 
Kong and reassure investors in Hong Kong that the territory’s current system would continue 
after 1997. 
However, discussions between Britain and China during and after Thatcher’s meeting 
with Chinese leader Deng Xiaoping and Chinese Premier Zhao Ziyang revealed two major flaws 
in Britain’s calculation that they had legal and economic leverage over China. First, while in 
theory, international law protected the territories of Hong Kong Island and the Kowloon 
Peninsula to Britain indefinitely, in practice, Britain’s administration of these parts required the 
leased area of the New Territories. This is because Hong Kong was only economically and 
politically viable as one entity due to infrastructural interdependency and near total economic 
integration of the three areas. Similarly, China refuted Britain’s claim to sovereignty over the 
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ceded territories because, according to them, the treaties were signed by unequal powers in an 
era of western imperialism. As the leader of the Chinese Communist Party, Deng argued that 
Britain coerced a weakened Chinese state into exchanging territory. According to Deng, the PRC 
represented a different China to the imperial dynasty that signed the treaties as an act of 
cowardice; he refused to commit a similar action.   
The second flaw was that Britain wrongly assumed China cared more about the negative 
economic consequences itself and Hong Kong would face if British administration ended than 
reunifying Hong Kong with the Mainland. British officials initially determined that, because 
China benefited from Hong Kong economically, a verbal cession of British sovereignty would 
suffice China’s political interests while allowing Britain to maintain de facto sovereignty. 
However, for China, Hong Kong represented a source of national pride and political identity — 
as the Chinese said, they would take Hong Kong “as a barren rock.”56 Britain, therefore, both 
overestimated the economic leverage they had over China in maintaining full British control of 
domestic and external affairs in Hong Kong and underestimated the symbolic and political 
importance China attributed to reclaiming total sovereignty of Hong Kong.57  
Britain’s legal and economic miscalculations leading up to and after Thatcher’s visit to 
China in 1982 resulted in Britain eventually making a concession on Hong Kong’s sovereignty. . 
This chapter argues that Britain was forced to offer a concession as a result of underestimating 
the importance China placed on reunifying Hong Kong, which undermined the practicability of 
their legal claims  
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I  British Goals for Hong Kong   
In the lead up to Thatcher’s visit to China in 1982, several British officials warned her 
that China would demand sovereignty over Hong Kong after 1997.  In January 1982, Percy 
Cradock reported to London that “a willingness to cede sovereignty… will be essential to an 
[sic] satisfactory settlement.”58  
In Thatcher’s view, it was better for Britain to lead the negotiations with an argument to 
keep Hong Kong under British sovereignty based on the legality of the treaties of the ceded 
territories. Thatcher’s “instinct was to concede nothing until it was clear we could obtain 
precisely what we wanted.’59 For Thatcher, if Britain began discussions on these grounds, it 
would give Britain a stronger bargaining position and signal to the Chinese that Britain sought to 
protect their international claims to sovereignty of Hong Kong Island and the Kowloon 
Peninsula. Her position did not reflect an ignorance about China’s stance on sovereignty, but 
rather, a strategic negotiation strategy aimed at giving Britain more leverage. Furthermore, in 
Thatcher’s statement, the word “until” revealed that the British position was not unyielding. 
Instead, Thatcher indicated that she was willing to make concessions if the Chinese granted 
certain British demands.  
Both British officials and Margaret Thatcher agreed that the most important British 
demand and most acceptable and realistic foreign policy outcome for Britain was that all three 
parts of Hong Kong remain under British administration after 1997. Ultimately, the British were 
prepared to formally recognize Chinese sovereignty over Hong Kong in exchange for an 
international agreement that was registered and published with the United Nations under which 
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Britain would administer Hong Kong. Thatcher made it plain, however, that sovereignty in this 
context meant only titular sovereignty.60 For the British, administration of Hong Kong after 1997 
meant full control of domestic and external affairs in Hong Kong. It also required assurances 
from China that they would give Britain a period of fifteen years notice if any changes to the 
agreement needed to be made.61 Britain’s demand highlighted that the British entered the 
negotiations with their primary objective being to continue administering all three parts of Hong 
Kong after 1997; as such, Thatcher began the negotiations with arguments underscoring  
Britain’s sovereign claims to the ceded territories in order to strengthen Britain’s initial 
bargaining position.  
Granting titular sovereignty of the entirety of Hong Kong to China in exchange for 
continued administration of Hong Kong represented the most acceptable solution to HMG 
because it would preserve the status quo and thus restore investor confidence in Hong Kong. As 
explored in chapter one, without the assurance of continued British administration, British 
corporations, institutional investors, and other economic stakeholders in Hong Kong were less 
likely to commit money to Hong Kong. In contrast, Britain, through its imposition of an 
internationally accepted legal system and currency, created the investment security foreign 
business interests required. 
It was in this context that in September 1982, Margaret Thatcher visited China to 
formally open the first phase of negotiations on Hong Kong’s future. Thatcher attended two 
meetings with Zhao Ziyang and a single meeting with Deng Xiaoping, who agreed that the 
purpose of talks was to “have serious talks at official level about the future of Hong Kong.” 62 
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Initial discussions between Britain and China centered on the question of Hong Kong 
sovereignty, the international validity of the treaties ceding Hong Kong Island and the Kowloon 
Peninsula to Britain, and the continuation of British administration after 1997.  
 
II Thatcher’s 1982 State Visit to China  
Thatcher’s discussions with Zhao and Deng highlighted that both powers held different 
assumptions and worldviews about the role of international law in treaty making. Thatcher 
insisted that the treaty of Nanking and Convention of Peking granted Britain indefinite 
sovereignty of Hong Kong Island and the Kowloon Peninsula and told China that the treaties 
could not be abrogated, only altered by an Act of Parliament. Her initial stated aim to China was 
to retain sovereignty of Hong Kong Island and the Kowloon Peninsula and administration of the 
New Territories.63 Thatcher also aimed to secure more robust assurances about Hong Kong’s 
future from China in order to respond to international businesses concerned about their 
investments after the New Territories Lease expired. 64  
During both meetings, Zhao and Deng denied almost all British propositions and declared 
that the treaties were invalid products of imperial aggression. Deng said that Hong Kong 
belonged to China and both Chinese leaders argued that China would recover sovereignty of 
Hong Kong and that no other country would be allowed to administer Hong Kong in place of 
China. In line with its policy toward Taiwan, Deng proposed making Hong Kong a Special 
Administrative Region with a high degree of autonomy. He reasoned that this action, which 
would rule out British administration but maintain Hong Kong’s autonomy, would be sufficient 
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to preserve confidence. He also added a significant remark that, if it came to a clash, China 
would put sovereignty above Hong Kong’s economic prosperity. Nonetheless, he hoped for 
British co-operation.  
Thus, Britain and China disagreed about the validity of the three treaties ceding and 
leasing Hong Kong to Britain. In Britain’s case, they assumed that international law protected 
their sovereignty over Hong Kong. As China was a sovereign state in the 19th century, Britain 
concluded that it could enter valid treaties. However, in China’s case, Britain had coerced the 
Qing dynasty into signing the treaties as a result of imperial dominance. The fact that these 
treaties were signed after a war and impeded China’s sovereign rights, in China’s view, made the 
treaties invalid. Moreover, China’s leaders realized that the unequal treaties were signed by the 
Qing dynasty, the last imperial dynasty of China, and not the PRC; as such, the treaties were not 
made with the PRC’s consent, which thereby made them invalid. 
 
III Hong Kong: Three parts, indivisible 
While China and Britain disagreed on the validity of the three treaties, they agreed—
though through different arguments and assumptions — that Hong Kong had to be considered as 
one entity. This agreement supported China’s argument that they “would not agree to a 
separation of ceded and leased territories.” 65 However, while in principle it did not invalidate 
Britain’s legal claims to Hong Kong Island and the Kowloon Peninsula, it did significantly 
weaken the importance of these claims in practice. This is because the three areas of Hong Kong 
were infrastructurally interdependent with near total economic integration. With the New 
Territories lease set to return to China in 1997 and with China’s refusal to allow British 
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administration to continue, Britain had no practical legal claims to continue their administration 
in the New Territories once the lease expired.  
On one hand, China believed that, despite the treaties that past governments had signed 
ceding Hong Kong to Britain, Hong Kong had always remained a part of China. Britain, on the 
other hand, insisted that their legal claims to Hong Kong effected a definitive separation of Hong 
Kong from the Chinese mainland. Moreover, the stark socioeconomic and political differences 
that arose between Hong Kong and China during British sovereignty only underscored the 
apparent separation of Hong Kong from Mainland China.  
Chinese statements regarded Hong Kong as a whole and showed that they would not 
agree to a separation of ceded and leased territories66 Deng Xiaoping in particular defined the 
Chinese government’s position and refused to make a concession on any part of Hong Kong’s 
sovereignty.67 For Deng, failing to reclaim Hong Kong’s sovereignty would make him the same 
as Li Hongzhang—the diplomat who signed away the New Territories lease in 1898 to Britain. 
Deng categorized Li Hongzhang as a traitor and determined that, even if the PRC had to take 
Hong Kong back as a “barren rock”, it would be better than repeating the humiliation China 
faced toward the end of the Qing dynasty.68 Furthermore, this humiliation at the hands of the 
West in the nineteenth century was used as tinder to spark the nationalist fire in the PRC. In this 
context, Deng’s rejection of the embarrassing treaties signed by the Qing dynasty can be seen as 
a symbolic political maneuver used to garner Chinese nationalism.69 
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Britain reached the conclusion that infrastructural interdependency and near total 
economic integration of all three areas meant that it was only economically and politically viable 
to manage Hong Kong as one entity. British official, Haddon-Clave, investigated the 
interdependency between the ceded and leased territories and concluded that the ceded and 
leased territories were complementary, with business services located in the ceded areas and 
manufacturing industry in the New Territories.70 Therefore, despite Britain’s legal claims to 
Hong Kong Island and the Kowloon Peninsula, without the New Territories after 1997, they 
could not continue to administer Hong Kong.  
The ceded territories contained 40% of the population of 5.1 million but did not have the 
essential services necessary to support this population because of its focus on business services.  
Contained within the ceded territories was 86% of the total number of business establishments 
(and 88% in terms of employment) and 67% of all institutions of tertiary education. While these 
two features offered the potential for future technological advancement and the development of 
entrepreneurial skills in the ceded territories, they still could not meet the basic needs, such as 
food, water, and electricity, that its residents required.71  
Additionally, the ceded territories counted for a meager 8% of the total surface area of 
Hong Kong, and most of the land capable of development had already been developed to its 
maximum potential. There were insufficient reservoirs to meet the water demand, and the two 
power stations in the ceded territories did not produce an adequate amount of power for the 
residents.72 By focusing on commercial, financial and allied services, the ceded territories had 
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grown dependent on the leased New Territories and could not meet all the demands of its 
residents. 
In contrast, the leased territories housed most of Hong Kong’s industry and generating 
capacity and provided most of the food for the ceded territories. Geographically, the New 
Territories counted for 92% of the land area and 60% of the population of Hong Kong. As a 
much vaster area with less development, the New Territories had much more potential for 
agricultural and industrial manufacturing activities. For example, the main economic activity was 
manufacturing, which accounted for 62% of the total number of business establishments (and 
71% in terms of employment) located there. Most importantly, the leased territories housed all 
major reservoirs and container ports and provided virtually all primary production for Hong 
Kong – meeting 45% of the colony-wide demand for fresh vegetables, 15% of the demand for 
live pigs and 43% of the demand for live birds.73 Hong Kong thus depended on the New 
Territories to meet its residents’ basic needs.  
In addition to the resource dependency between the ceded and leased territories, British 
officials concluded that a separation could also lead to security problems in Hong Kong. The 
Hong Kong International Airport spilled into the New Territories and blurred the boundary point 
between the ceded and leased territories. If the New Territories were administered by China but 
Hong Kong Island and the Kowloon Peninsula were administered by Britain, then the airport 
would straddle two separately administered territories.74 British officials concluded that any 
situation separating the administration of Hong Kong would thus “present intolerable problems 
of security, law and order.”75 
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The structural and economic dependency between the three areas also impacted the 
movement of labor between the ceded and leased territories making any separation untenable. 
Cliff-Hadden reported that “each day 524,000 workers, or 23% of the employed labor force 
move from one to the other.” 76 Thus, in the event that the ceded territories were separated from 
the leased territories, the economy of the ceded territories was unlikely to survive as laborers 
would be restricted from moving between their homes and their places of work.  
British officials also concluded that a split between the ceded and leased territories would 
probably lead to “a massive movement of the population southwards with considerable civil 
unrest.”77 This was because family ties between people living north and south of the boundary—
called boundary street-- were strong. 40% of the Hong Kong population were born in China and 
many others born in Hong Kong had parents who were immigrants from China. Hong Kong’s 
migrant population mostly viewed the prospect of a return to the conditions they left in China as 
unfavorable and preferred British run Hong Kong.78   
Based on Haddon-Clave’s arguments, Britain concluded that infrastructural 
interdependency and near total economic integration of all three areas of Hong Kong rendered it 
impossible for the UK to retain and run only the ceded territories. This conclusion, reached by 
British officials, had major implications for British leverage in the negotiations. Britain’s 
strongest legal argument did not protect their administration of the New Territories, and China 
refused to consider partitioning Hong Kong. The interdependency of the territories of Hong 
Kong and China’s claim to the New Territories after 1997 thus constrained Britain’s options for 
negotiations. Britain could stay in the ceded territories but knew that this would not be 
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sustainable in the long-term. They, therefore, concluded that preserving Hong Kong’s economic 
and political viability as one entity trumped British interests and prestige in staying in just the 
ceded territories.  
Fig 1. Relative Importance of New Territories and Other Parts of Hong Kong, 1982 79 
 Hong Kong and Kowloon 
Peninsula 
New Territories  
(including New Kowloon) 
Area (Total 400 sq.m) 8% 92% 
Population (Total 5.1 million) 40% 60% 
Economic activity (number of 
people employed in commercial and 
financial services) 
88% 12% 
 
Wholesale retail 71% 29% 
Manufacturing 29% 71% 
Water (18% supplied from China) No reservoirs of any 
significance 
All major reservoirs 
Power Generation Capacity not sufficient for area Contains major reservoirs 
International Transport Macau ferry terminal Airport (on reclaimed land) 
Shipping Some docks and lighter 
loading 
Container port 
Education (tertiary education 
places) 
67% 33% 
Primary Production (considerable 
imports from China) 
Virtually nil 45% fresh vegetables; 15% 
pigs; 43% live birds 
Potential for further development Small Still considerable 
 
 
IV  Preserving Economic Viability  
 
The second major setback for Britain was their incorrect assumption that China would 
want British administration to continue to preserve Hong Kong’s economic viability. Britain 
entered the negotiations with the assumption that they had a strong economic argument to justify 
the continuation of de facto British sovereignty. They also determined that China did not 
understand the essential factors on which Hong Kong’s economic prosperity was based and so 
would desire the preservation of British administration.  To achieve economic stability, Britain 
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insisted that it would need to be assured full authority on domestic matters and responsibility for 
Hong Kong in international political and economic affairs.80  
 In the prelude to Thatcher’s visit, China gave the FCO reason to doubt that they 
understood the essential economic factors responsible for Hong Kong’s prosperity. On April 6th, 
1982, Deng told former British Prime Minister and acting British official, Edward Heath, that 
“sovereignty over Hong Kong would belong to China, but that Hong Kong itself could remain a 
free port and an international financial center.”81 During this discussion, British officials 
concluded that the Chinese did not understand the main factors necessary to maintain stability 
and confidence in Hong Kong. For example, China’s plan to have Hong Kong transition to a 
semi-autonomous territory within the Chinese system offered investors “no faith in the future” 
because there would be no secure basis for an independent Hong Kong Dollar; a loss of the 
network of commercial and other agreements which the UK secured for Hong Kong through its 
adherence to international law; and a loss of the local legal system which was internationally 
recognized, and which provided backing for Hong Kong’s separate economic status.82  
Furthermore, in conversations with British officials, Deng’s comments demonstrated a 
misunderstanding of Hong Kong’s fiscal policy, which concerned British officials who wanted to 
keep Hong Kong’s markets attractive to investors. In 1982, Heath probed Deng on the question 
of economic prosperity and revealed that Deng was under the illusion that the UK treasury 
received taxation revenue from Hong Kong. In reality, Britain received no revenue from Hong 
Kong, and Hong Kong was self-supporting.83 Britain worried that if Deng did not understand the 
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existing tax policy, which involved keeping low tax rates to attract business investment, he may 
make changes that would cause adverse economic outcomes for Hong Kong. For example, under 
British administered Hong Kong, the corporate tax rate in 1980 was 16.5%.84 This rate was 
significantly lower than the average corporate income tax rate of 47.5% in 1981 for countries in 
the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development.85 For Hong Kong to continue to 
attract high quality international investors, British officials concluded that the Chinese must 
understand Hong Kong’s tax policy to maintain future investments, which were key to Hong 
Kong’s prosperity.  
Britain’s conclusion that Deng did not understand the essential economic and fiscal 
policies of Hong Kong’s economy convinced British Officials that China could not economically 
administer Hong Kong and maintain investor confidence. Sir Percy Cradock informed British 
officials that they “must correct Chinese misconceptions and try to explain to them how to avoid 
killing the Goose that lays the golden eggs.”86 FCO officials thus concentrated their efforts on 
trying to educate the Chinese about the complexity of Hong Kong’s economy and the vital issue 
of maintaining investor confidence. For the British, an internationally accepted currency, 
continuity and predictability in law and administration, and established trading agreements 
underpinned Hong Kong’s economic prosperity by making it an attractive destination for foreign 
investors. 87 If China did not understand Hong Kong’s economic machinery, the British believed 
they would be unable to maintain Hong Kong’s economic prosperity.   
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 Another major contributing factor to Britain’s assessment that a Chinese administered 
Hong Kong could not guarantee confidence was China’s recent history. British officials judged 
that the past twenty years in China, particularly, the Cultural Revolution, led both the people in 
Hong Kong and outside investors to be unsure about an arrangement that transferred 
administration of Hong Kong’s economy to China.88 They argued that China’s recent history has 
involved periods of “pragmatism [that] have alternated with bouts of extremism and 
chauvinism.”89 Thus, international investors were wary of complete Chinese sovereignty over 
Hong Kong given its erratic political and economic record.  
 Britain thus concluded that British administration was in both the best interest of Britain 
and China and assumed China would find these arguments persuasive. As evidenced by their 
trips to China to educate Chinese officials on the workings of the Hong Kong economy, British 
officials sought to prioritize Hong Kong’s economic viability in all potential outcomes.   
 
V China Running Hong Kong  
 
Despite Britain’s arguments that Hong Kong’s economic prosperity necessitated British 
administration, China carried the strong conviction that they could manage Hong Kong just as 
well. In the 1970s, China modernization policy, including the formulation of the Four 
Modernizations Program in the fields of agriculture, industry, technology and defense, led to 
further modernization efforts from the Chinese. In 1978, Deng’s Open Door Policy created  
several Special Economic Zones (SEZs) strategically located near Hong Kong, Taiwan and 
Macau, and signaled that China sought to boost its economy through foreign investment.90 
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China’s plans for industrial modernization in Guangdong Province, notably the development of 
new industrial complexes like the Shum Chun Special Economic Zone just north of the Hong 
Kong border, heightened China’s desire to administer Hong Kong. Incorporating Hong Kong’s 
economy more closely with Guangdong through Deng’s Open Door Policy therefore provided 
economic synergies for China and a financial and logistical base for China’s modernization.  
The PRC offered Shanghai’s recent economic success as an example to prove that a 
Chinese run state could be prosperous, but this comparison was later undermined. China’s 
comparison received backlash in an article by the Asian Wall Street Journal released on 
December 30th, 1982 called “Ten Main Ingredients of Hong Kong’s Success” which challenged 
that running Shanghai well did not mean China could run Hong Kong because Hong Kong and 
Shanghai represented very different cases. 91 For example, Shanghai was a great manufacturing 
center and port and was not a financial or commercial center in the international sense like Hong 
Kong. Ideas such as this fueled Britain’s belief that the Chinese communists could not run a 
capitalist, free-trade economy.  
Though China did believe it could sustain Hong Kong’s economic success, their primary 
motivation for recovering total sovereignty of Hong Kong was symbolic and political in nature.  
Britain was mistaken to assume that China cared predominantly about the economic 
consequences itself and Hong Kong would face if British administration ended. Thatcher failed 
to assign the correct importance to Hong Kong’s future political identity for the Chinese and did 
not consider that Deng saw Hong Kong as part of a larger Chinese reunification process that 
included Taiwan and Macau. When Thatcher met with Deng Xiaoping to rearticulate Britain’s 
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position on sovereignty and its desire to continue to administer Hong Kong after the New 
Territories Lease expired, Deng declared that if sovereignty over Hong Kong were not recovered 
then “it would mean that the new China was like the China of the Qing dynasty.”92 China sought 
to reclaim sovereignty over Hong Kong to end the unequal treaties and reclaim honor and 
authority. After China’s Century of Humiliation– a period of intervention and imperialism by the 
Western powers and Japan between 1839 and 1949 — the continued existence of Hong Kong as 
a British territory could no longer be tolerated. Instead, as a vestige of the Qing dynasty’s 
weakness and the agonies it endured at the hands of Western powers, it had to end.93  
British officials initially determined that because China benefited from Hong Kong 
economically, a verbal cession of British sovereignty would suffice China’s political interests 
while allowing Britain to maintain de facto sovereignty. However, for China, Hong Kong 
represented a source of national pride and political identity — as the Chinese said, they would 
take Hong Kong “as a barren rock.”94 Britain therefore miscalculated their economic leverage 
over maintaining full control of domestic and external affairs in Hong Kong.95 Britain’s 
assumption directly conflicted with China’s earlier statement that Hong Kong would be treated 
like Taiwan under the “one country, two systems” program. Under this scenario, Britain would 
lose all administrative power in Hong Kong, and the Hong Kong people themselves would 
assume administrative control with oversight from China. This miscalculation slowed down 
negotiations with the Chinese who refused to participate in more substantive talks on Hong 
Kong’s future until Britain made a concession on sovereignty.  
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VI Britain Makes a Concession  
In late February 1983, Cradock and Edward Youde responded to Britain’s weakened 
position and sought to secure an agreement from Thatcher that would draw the Chinese back to 
the negotiating table. Cradock drafted a letter to the Chinese leadership that he passed on to 
Margaret Thatcher in hopes of persuading her to agree to a new tactic. On 10 March 1983, 
Thatcher sent the secret letter to Zhao Ziyang and outlined her consent to defer the question of 
sovereignty to Parliament and the people of Hong Kong. The central passage read:  
Provided that agreements could be reached between the British and Chinese 
Governments on administrative arrangements for Hong Kong which would guarantee the 
future of prosperity and stability of Hong Kong and would be acceptable to the British 
Parliament and to the people of Hong Kong as well as to the Chinese Government, I 
would be prepared to recommend to Parliament that sovereignty over the whole of Hong 
Kong should revert to China. 96 
Because relinquishing sovereignty of Hong Kong Island and the Kowloon Peninsula required an 
Act of Parliament, Thatcher’s letter did not officially cede anything. However, the word 
“recommend” differentiated it from previous British positions that had said they would 
“consider” the question of sovereignty. The verb substitution, therefore, implicitly suggested that 
if the right conditions were met, Thatcher would endorse Britain ceding sovereignty to China to 
the British Parliament. According to Cradock, Zhao in his reply deliberately misinterpreted the 
letter to state that the recovery of sovereignty by China was “the premise and basis for further 
talks.”97 While Zhao’s reply misrepresented the nuance of Britain’s letter, he did confirm that the 
formal negotiation process could move forward. On 12 May 1983, Thatcher told the Cabinet that 
“we are still treading on eggshells, but it looks as if we can start talks.”98  
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Ultimately, pragmatism won out as Britain evaluated that they had much more at risk 
without an agreement than with a formal cession of Hong Kong sovereignty to China. Without 
making a concession on sovereignty, the only other option in Hong Kong was military 
intervention. However, the Chinese presented no military threat to Hong Kong and were 
participating in diplomatic discussions to resolve the problem of Hong Kong’s future after 
1997.99 In addition, even if such a threat did arise, Britain could not defend Hong Kong against a 
determined Chinese attack.  
The British concluded that even if international law protected British sovereignty of 
Hong Kong Island and the Kowloon Peninsula, British administration in just the ceded territories 
was untenable. In addition, Britain overestimated the relative economic importance of Hong 
Kong to China by failing to fully appreciate the political importance of Hong Kong for China’s 
larger reunification project— including reunification with Macau and Taiwan. Chinese leaders 
viewed the unequal treaties as an embarrassment to the Chinese people and as a nationalist 
rallying-point.  Whereas earlier Chinese leaders had been content to benefit from Hong Kong 
under British rule, Deng took a deep personal interest and leadership role in the recovery of 
Hong Kong and believed that the PRC could benefit economically from Hong Kong’s return. 
This directly countered the analysis of the British Foreign and Commonwealth office who 
thought that China’s economic dependence on Hong Kong gave them the upper hand in the 
negotiations.  If in 1979, it was the British who were pressing the Chinese on Hong Kong’s 
future, by 1983, the situation had shifted, and it was China who was pressing Britain into 
agreeing to cede sovereignty of Hong Kong Island and Kowloon Peninsula. 
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CHAPTER 3 
THE END OF THE NEGOTIATIONS, 1983-1984 
On 1 July 1983, Peking, London and Hong Kong issued a public statement agreeing to a 
second phase of talks on the future of Hong Kong. After a year of slow progress in which Britain 
and China struggled to negotiate the question of ceding Hong Kong sovereignty, the next phase 
of negotiations centered on how to administer Hong Kong after 1997. The signing of the Sino-
British Joint Declaration at the end of 1984 marked the close of the negotiations and laid out the 
main terms of the agreement regarding Hong Kong’s future status. Under the Declaration, Hong 
Kong transitioned to a Special Administrative Region of China with a high degree of autonomy.  
Britain and China heralded the Joint Declaration as a success, but contemporary works of 
history, memoir and journalism on the Joint Declaration have almost uniformly criticized the 
British for ignoring their moral responsibility to the people of Hong Kong throughout the 
negotiations. Authors such as Mark Roberti and Robert Cottrell argue that Britain failed to 
include Hong Kong residents in the negotiations and that the British therefore betrayed Hong 
Kong. As a journalist, Roberti argues that the Declaration was a mere short-term solution that 
allowed the British to look good by leaving the territory and guaranteeing the Hong Kong people 
to have a high degree of autonomy, at the expense of denying Hong Kong people a right to their 
own future in the long-term.100  
At the same time, these sources minimize China’s bilateral negotiation demands and 
overlook how China’s view that the Hong Kong people were members of the PRC precluded 
Britain from legitimately advocating on behalf of the Hong Kong population. The Chinese 
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argued that any such attempt by the British would be invalid and unrepresentative of the opinions 
of the Chinese people, which to them, included the residents of both mainland China and the 
Hong Kong territory.  
This chapter makes and important contribution to the existing literature that claims that 
Britain did an injustice to the Hong Kong people by not representing their interests or 
perspective during the bilateral negotiation process with China, by complicating the story. It does 
not intend to justify Britain’s actions toward the Hong Kong people, but rather examines their 
actions in the context of China’s tough negotiating constraints, that have typically been ignored. 
It will be argued that China’s insistence that the Hong Kong people were and always will be 
part of the PRC undermined any British attempts to advocate on behalf of the Hong Kong people 
in a direct way. Nevertheless, Britain used the legal and economic arguments available to them 
to advocate for the same outcomes that most of the Hong Kong people supported. For example, 
throughout 1983, public opinion data in Hong Kong supported continued British administration. 
While at points during the negotiations, the Hong Kong people felt a sense of betrayal toward the 
British, these concerns derived from the overt differences in how Britain and China practiced 
diplomacy and conducted formal negotiations —not from Britain directly rejecting moral 
responsibility to the people of Hong Kong.  
Britain did not achieve continued administration of Hong Kong and ceded sovereignty of 
Hong Kong Island and the Kowloon Peninsula to China despite international law guaranteeing 
them to Britain indefinitely. Given the constraints from China and the legal and economic claims 
that Britain had, they did reach an agreement with China whereby Hong Kong existed as one 
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entity with a high degree of autonomy and that was acceptable enough to the people of Hong 
Kong and international investors that they stayed in the territory.  
I  Chinese propaganda versus British confidentiality  
Britain and China practiced different diplomacy strategies during the negotiations; Britain 
committed to confidentiality while China enacted a targeted propaganda campaign. Britain 
determined that confidentiality was an essential requirement of any formal negotiation between 
two powers and therefore concluded that China’s propaganda mission violated these terms. 
However, China continued to promote their policies publicly while Britain’s commitment to 
confidentiality made them remain silent on the negotiations in public. Differences in negotiation 
strategies ultimately gave China the power to influence public perception of British policy in 
their public media campaigns.   
During the second phase of negotiations, press coverage in China concerning Hong 
Kong’s future became more aggressive on the question of sovereignty and Britain’s colonial 
past. After Thatcher’s 1982 visit to China, the FCO dedicated an entire research team to 
monitoring press coverage on the negotiations and concluded that China’s messaging advanced 
four central claims. First, the messaging declared that Britain’s claim to sovereignty was unequal 
and invalid due to their colonial past; second, it claimed that Britain had already ceded 
sovereignty; third, it argued that the Hong Kong people supported the Chinese solution, and last, 
it declared that unless an agreement was reached by the “deadline” of September 1984 China 
would make a unilateral decision on Hong Kong’s future. 101 
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The language invoked in China’s propaganda campaign sought to undermine the 
legitimacy of Britain’s legal claims to Hong Kong by presenting it as an imperial power. On 29 
January 1983, the FCO reported that the two principal communist newspapers, Ta Kung Pao and 
Wen Wei Po, gave front page coverage to a China News Service (CNS) dispatch called 
“contemporary historical research” published by the Chinese academy of social sciences. 
According to the CNS dispatch, the history of the three “unequal” treaties represented “the 
criminal record of Britain’s barbarous invasion of China and a testimony to the oppression and 
the humiliation which the Chinese people had suffered.”102 Wen Wei Po said that few 
“compatriots” in Hong Kong disputed China’s sovereignty and that efforts to produce a deal 
favorable to Britain by “sly bargaining” over the value of Hong Kong to China in foreign 
exchange terms would be futile. 103 Through these phrases, China created a powerful narrative 
that rejected Britain’s claim to sovereignty and suggested that Hong Kong’s return to China was 
a matter of international justice. The explicit purpose of the campaign throughout 1983 was to 
call on Britain to set aside their legal arguments concerning the validity of the treaties. 
In addition to press reports, China’s public statements invoked anti-colonial sentiment on the 
question of Hong Kong’s future. In June 1983, Deng Xiaoping met Hong Kong and Macau 
delegates at the National People’s Congress and Chinese People’s Political Consultative 
Conference to reiterate China’s negotiation goals. Deng promised no changes to Hong Kong’s 
social system and life-style and assured that people’s living standard would not be lowered.  104 
His promise served the political purpose of assuring the Hong Kong people of their continued 
prosperity and semi-autonomy at a time when uncertainty about the future began resurface. 
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However, Deng demanded that Hong Kong law should change because: “anything that smacks of 
colonialism of Great Britain must be removed.” 105 China thus aimed to win support from the 
Hong Kong people by reassuring them that Chinese administration would protect their way of 
life. In the process of doing this, it was also clear that one of their other goals was to invalidate 
the legitimacy of Britain’s legal claims and force Britain to acquiesce to its toughened position 
on ceding sovereignty and administration of Hong Kong.  
II The Indivisibility of Sovereignty and Administration  
However, China issued conflicting messages about the possibility of continued British 
administration, which raised the hopes of certain British officials in the negotiations. At the 
beginning of 1983, Chinese leaders told the Hong Kong people that the territory would transition 
to a Special Administrative Region (SAR) governed by individuals who supported China’s claim 
to sovereignty.106 China’s vague qualification for who could govern Hong Kong did not 
explicitly exclude former colonial officials if they formally acknowledged Chinese sovereignty. 
On this basis, FCO officials concluded that continued British administration was a possibility 
despite China’s propaganda campaign. In addition, senior Chinese officials made great efforts to 
appear more conciliatory, emphasizing that they wished to maintain the territory’s capitalist 
system to continue stability.107 Thus, the FCO concluded that Britain’s primary interest in 1983 
should be to maintain British administration to preserve Hong Kong’s economic vitality.  
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As the FCO monitored Chinese propaganda to track China’s toughening position, British 
officials debated whether sovereignty and administration were inextricable. Britain assumed that 
if they could find historical examples of territories which had been administered by an actor 
other than the sovereign, then they could use these territories as evidence against the Chinese 
claim that sovereignty and administration were necessarily indivisible.  
However, the FCO failed to develop a compelling argument in support of divisions between 
sovereign and administrative powers based on historical precedents. While FCO researchers 
found numerous examples of countries or territories with histories of divided sovereign and 
administrative powers, in most instances they were former mandated or trust territories or 
protectorates. For example, among the examples FCO researchers found were Macao, the Sudan, 
Panama, Congo and Egypt.108 FCO officials analyzed the relevance of each case to Britain’s 
legal consideration in Hong Kong and Richard Clift concluded that each precedent was “loaded 
with colonialist overtones” 109 and thus offered no marginal value to Britain’s debate with 
China.110  
China’s hard line on the indivisibility of sovereignty and administration weakened Britain’s 
strategy to recognize titular sovereignty in exchange for continued administration of Hong Kong. 
FCO officials realized that China was taking an increasingly tough line in the talks and that 
China was publicly insisting that they would take back control of Hong Kong in 1997. China 
also said that, unless they reached an agreement by 1984,they would make a unilateral decision 
on the future of Hong Kong. 111 Through an intense propaganda campaign aimed at convincing 
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the Hong Kong people of the inevitability of China’s plan to make Hong Kong a Special 
Administrative Region, China forced Britain into a weakened position. FCO officials therefore 
concluded that the prospect of Britain maintaining even administration powers over Hong Kong 
seemed unlikely.  
III  A Crisis of Confidence  
In 1983, the FCO devised a formal statement on the progress of the Hong Kong negotiations 
that they deployed consistently in press conferences, official meetings and briefings of 
government ministers. It stated, “Our aim is to seek a solution acceptable to Britain, China and to 
the people of Hong Kong. Their views being taken fully into account.”112 However, Britain’s 
goal proved limited and difficult to quantify. The word “acceptable” was especially ambiguous 
and the international community demanded more information from the British side about the 
specific agenda items and action points they discussed with China.  
Despite enormous governmental and public opinion pressure to be more forthcoming on the 
negotiations, Britain refused to abandon their commitment to confidentiality. The FCO 
concluded that confidentiality would bolster confidence and was a central part of well-executed 
diplomacy.113 Unfortunately, this analysis backfired as the Hong Kong people interpreted 
Britain’s refusal to talk about the negotiations or respond to China’s propaganda as a lack of 
commitment to the territory.  
As a negotiator on behalf of the people of Hong Kong, the FCO concluded that Britain had 
an obligation to speak not only for itself but also for Hong Kong. The British publicly and 
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emphatically stated their goal to “reflect the community’s cause vigorously.”114 Certain FCO 
officials believed in Britain’s moral commitment to the people of Hong Kong more than they 
believed in the importance of good British and Chinese relationships. In a letter to Robert Adley, 
Lord Belstead stated: “it would not be right to place a higher premium on good UK/ China 
relations than on this fundamental moral responsibility.”115 The symbol of the three-legged chair 
became associated with this way of thinking and was publicly criticized by the Chinese. Coined 
by Lord Belstead, a firm proponent of Britain’s moral obligation to the people of Hong Kong, 
each leg of the chair represented China, Britain and Hong Kong. The analogy suggested that a 
functional and acceptable arrangement would be one in which each country’s voices had been 
taken fully into account. 
In response to a flurry of requests from the Hong Kong people to be more represented in the 
negotiations, the FCO made active efforts to consult with groups in Hong Kong on the territory’s 
future.116 The Executive or Legislative Councils (LEGCO) were Britain’s primary consulting 
group in Hong Kong. Specifically, LEGCO advised the British negotiating team on Hong Kong 
opinion and made recommendations for negotiation strategies to employ with China. However, 
LEGCO did not truly represent the voices of the Hong Kong people, because they were 
appointed, rather than elected.117 However, with no electoral tradition in Hong Kong, the FCO 
found it difficult to find a group who did.   
The FCO additionally concluded that ‘localizing’ the Hong Kong Government would make 
the outcomes of the negotiations easier for Britain to control.  By ‘localizing,’ the FCO meant 
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giving the Hong Kong government more autonomy, particularly in internal affairs, and reducing 
the areas where HMG previously intervened.118 This solution offered several advantages. First, it 
had the potential to reduce the Hong Kong government’s requirement to consult HMG on 
appointments, promotions and dismissals. Second, it would increase and accelerate the number 
of Hong Kong Chinese employed in senior grades, and it would remove the requirement for 
Administrative Officers to be British passport-holders.119 While the Hong Kong Governor, 
Edward Youde, doubted the efficacy of taking any action at this stage that might appear to dilute 
the role of HMG, he agreed with FCO officials that change was both desirable and inevitable in 
the longer term. Granting Hong Kong more autonomy to govern itself would ultimately limit 
China’s administrative powers.  
While Britain attempted to demonstrate to Hong Kong that they understood their anxiety 
about the future, Chinese officials rejected Britain’s bid to consider the Hong Kong people in the 
negotiations. In the existing literature, Britain has come under much criticism about excluding 
the voices of the people of Hong Kong. For example, in Mark Roberti’s account the negotiations 
represented a Chinese triumph and British betrayal.120 However, China’s insistence that the 
negotiations should be bilateral constrained Britain’s ability to legitimately include the voice of 
the Hong Kong people.  
For Britain, Hong Kong’s period of separation from China as a British colony complicated 
Hong Kong’s status, and Britain felt a responsibility to represent Hong Kong’s voices. In 1982, a 
parliamentary debate in Britain concluded that putting the eventual negotiation agreement to a 
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referendum in Hong Kong would be untenable due to China’s negotiating terms. Francis Pym 
reiterated China’s position by saying “the Chinese have made it clear that they consider the 
negotiations to be bilateral and that the views of the 5 million people of Hong Kong count for 
nothing against those of the 1 billion people of the PRC. A referendum would have unacceptable 
internal implications for them.” 121 China’s insistence on a bilateral negotiation reflected their 
position that Hong Kong was not autonomous but a central part of China. A referendum only 
counting Hong Kong’s voice would therefore not be representative to the PRC. China also 
advocated publicly that their solution was acceptable to the people of Hong Kong and so a 
referendum would be futile.  
FCO officials doubted the truth behind China’s claims that their solution was acceptable to 
the people of Hong Kong. Public opinion data collected by The Institute for the Study of Conflict 
and sent to the Secretary of State confirmed the FCO’s suspicions. The report highlighted two 
public opinion polls: the first, carried out on behalf of the Reform Club of Hong Kong, a body to 
which some elected members of the Urban Council belonged, found that “maintenance of the 
status quo” was the “preferred outcome” for 70 per cent of those questioned, while a further 15 
per cent opted for continued British administration under a “trust territory” arrangement to be 
made with China. The second poll was commissioned by the Hong Kong Observers who were a 
group that described itself as consisting of “about 30 concerned Hong Kong people from various 
walks of life, including lawyers, educators, journalists and business executives.” 122  In their poll 
respondents indicated which solutions they would find acceptable out of five options. 95 per cent 
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found “retention of the status quo” acceptable, 64 per cent wanted “Hong Kong to remain under 
British administration with sovereignty belonging to China” and only 26 per cent considered the 
possibility of “returning Hong Kong to China” – a phrase implying either only sovereignty or 
sovereignty plus administration — acceptable.123 However, while the data supported the FCO’s 
own conclusions about the acceptability of China’s claims to the Hong Kong people, the opinion 
data was ultimately limited due to the sample sizes of the respondents, as well as the inherent 
biases of the two groups who collected it. In addition, the categories used terms such as 
“acceptability” which meant different things to China and Britain.  
For Britain, an acceptable solution to the Sino-British negotiations preserved Hong Kong’s 
way of life.  British officials defined acceptability as “an agreement that would satisfy the 
majority of the people of Hong Kong to the extent that they would be prepared to continue to live 
in Hong Kong and not seek to remove themselves or their capital elsewhere.” 124 The idea of 
acceptability was thus inherently tied to the issue of immigration. Britain feared an influx of 
Hong Kong residents to the UK because, as Richard Clift concluded, such an immigration 
pattern would be “politically dangerous.”125 As chapter one outlines, Britain made an 
intervention to avoid this contingency and restrict movement in Hong Kong via the 1981 
Immigration Act. For many in Hong Kong, Britain’s public goal of an acceptable solution thus 
required a greater commitment to clarify immigration legislation to avoid the risk of large 
numbers trying to come to the UK from Hong Kong.  
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IV  The Problems of Confidentiality  
The effect of different negotiation strategies on Hong Kong’s future incited a crisis of public 
confidence in Hong Kong that gave rise to a sense of British betrayal. While British policy and 
goals evolved within the FCO, Britain’s commitment to confidentiality meant that the Hong 
Kong people and international community held only a vague idea of the British side of the 
negotiations.  
In contrast to China’s propaganda claims, Britain’s commitment to confidentiality led 
people in Hong Kong and the international community to demand greater transparency from the 
UK. To everyone but the FCO, Britain’s commitment to confidentiality was problematic. In a 
white paper, Richard Clift, underscored some of the problems caused by the British 
confidentiality policy that were discussed in several news reports and reviews in Hong Kong. In 
addition to the people of Hong Kong, the American, French, German and Japanese governments 
demanded to know more about the British position in the negotiations.126 However, rather than 
acquiesce to demands to be more open, and even though China actively ignored the 
confidentially agreement, the FCO concluded that keeping the negotiations strictly confidential 
was “vitally important to maintain confidence in Hong Kong.”127 Britain urged Hong Kong 
people to “not take lack of official bulletins for lack of action. It is the talks themselves which 
count and not what is said outside them.”128 However, with no other information except 
propaganda issued from the PRC, Hong Kong people feared the worst and interpreted Britain’s 
commitment to confidentiality as a signal of British apathy toward Hong Kong’s future.  
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Economic downturn and a decline in public opinion signaled that the FCO wrongly 
concluded that confidentiality was key to maintaining confidence. During the recess in the talks 
in 1983, public and press opinion in Hong Kong became increasingly gloomy as reflected in the 
general trend of the stock market and the Hong Kong dollar. From 13- 16 September 1983, the 
HKD stood at a low figure of 7.89 to the US dollar . 129 In addition to a sharp depreciation in the 
exchange value of the Hong Kong dollar, sluggish growth in private consumption expenditure 
and a decline in private investment expenditure during a period of recovery in the export sector 
accompanied the second phase of the negotiations, demonstrating low consumer and business 
confidence in Hong Kong.130 
Ironically, this economic and public confidence crisis was exactly what Britain hoped to 
avoid by beginning the negotiations and maintaining their commitment to confidentiality. 
Finding no fault in their own policy, the FCO concluded that the main cause of the declines in 
confidence was the Chinese propaganda campaign.  
Britain entered the final round of negotiations with the hope that securing greater 
assurances from China about what a SAR would look like and maintaining confidentiality would 
restore lost confidence. However, in early September 1983, there was a general feeling in Hong 
Kong that people in Britain were apathetic towards Hong Kong. Britain offered limited 
information about the progress of the Sino-British talks on Hong Kong’s future and there was an 
absence of substantial British media coverage on the Hong Kong negotiations. This created an 
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unfavorable impression, both of HMG and of the Governor. Consequently, the prevailing attitude 
in Hong Kong was that HMG had a “a “less-than-total commitment to the negotiations.”131 
V Geoffrey Howe’s Visit and the End of Talks  
Even if Britain had opened up about the negotiations, their statements could not have 
revealed much substantive information. Despite over a dozen rounds of talks, Britain and 
China’s discussions were still not anchored in certainty about what the eventual agreement 
would look like. FCO officials researched possible solutions to questions about things like law, 
immigration and transfer of sovereignty, but concluded that the outcomes of the negotiations in 
Beijing since they resumed in the middle of August had been “disappointing.”132 It was not until 
Geoffrey Howe’s visit to Beijing, arranged for 15-18 April, 1984 that the initial drafts of the 
Sino-British Joint Declaration began to emerge.  
 For the Chinese, Sir Geoffrey Howe’s willingness to come to Beijing was a positive sign, 
a reassurance that the British did genuinely want to move forward towards an agreed solution 
despite being forced into concessions on the questions of sovereignty and administration. The 
common objective was to reach an agreement which fulfilled their joint purposes in Hong Kong. 
At the meeting, Zhao said that great progress had been made in the negotiations so far due to 
Britain’s recognition, in explicit terms, that China would resume the exercise of sovereignty over 
Hong Kong in 1997 and that Chinese sovereignty was not separable from its rights of 
administration of Hong Kong.133 Zhao also highlighted that to the extent permitted by the 
principle of Chinese sovereignty, the Chinese side had shown the greatest possible flexibility and 
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given full consideration to Britain’s concerns. The Secretary of State said that the two sides were 
close to understanding each other and agreed that great progress had been made on both sides.  
 On the afternoon of April 20th, Howe stood up in the Legislative Council Chamber and 
delivered to Hong Kong the most momentous news about 1997 ever to have been spoken by a 
British minister, saying “It would not be realistic to think in terms of an agreement that provides 
for continued British administration in Hong Kong after 1997.”134 He went on to outline the 
various pledges already made by China to leave Hong Kong substantially unchanged. Both sides 
also agreed that the document could be signed in September 1984 and ratified before the end of 
the year. However, Howe’s meeting with Deng Xiaoping had left much of the substance of the 
negotiation document unresolved.  
 In the months following Howe’s visit, the FCO concluded that the Chinese shift of 
position on their deadline, and Britain’s agreement to work for a draft to be published by 
September, imposed constraints on both sides. The FCO had drafted a general agreement that 
Howe’s visit made clear would not survive in its original form given China’s hard line on the 
indivisibly of sovereignty and administration. However, the Chinese did accept both the concept 
of a binding joint agreement and annexes, which would contain at least the bulk of the points 
agreed on in the FCO working papers.135 The major disagreement that occurred as both Britain 
and China committed to drafting up proposals was the establishment of a Joint Commission 
Group in Hong Kong to oversee the transfer. Convinced that this arrangement would fail, 
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Governor Youde instead suggested a Sino-British Joint Liaison Group that would be strictly 
consultative.  
 Further, Howe’s trip to Beijing deepened friendly relations between him and his Chinese 
counterpart, Wu Xueqian. Howe was able to send a strong private message to Wu following the 
fifteenth round of talks urging that a commitment to an agreement should be translated as 
quickly as possible into substance at the negotiating table. Howe and Wu agree that the working 
group should be launched in tandem with the main negotiations and should concentrate on 
finalizing the text of the main agreement, based on China’s “Twelve Points,” while the main 
team continued to work on the main material. 
 With this new structure and an impending deadline, the Joint Declaration, after 21 
months of discussions, formally began to emerge. By early September 1984, the British and 
Chinese negotiators in Peking agreed to the texts of an agreement on the future of Hong Kong. 
This agreement declared that Hong Kong would become a Special Administrative Region (SAR) 
of the People’s Republic of China from 1997 under specified arrangements and with a high 
degree of autonomy. The agreement was published as a White Paper on the day it was initialed in 
Peking on 26 September 1984. Upon reflection, the FCO concluded that it met all the British 
Government’s essential requirements, namely: that it was an unequivocally  binding international 
agreement; that it contained sufficient detail and clarity about the arrangements to apply to Hong 
Kong after 1997 to command the confidence of the people of Hong Kong; and finally, that it 
contained a provision that its terms would be stipulated in the basic law to be passed by the 
National People’s Congress of China, which will in effect form the constitution of post-1997 
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Hong Kong. 136 For the British, the major points that the Declaration fell short on was the right of 
British Dependent Territory Citizens to transmit their status for one generation to their children 
after 1997They also failed to persuade the Chinese that a Chief Executive of Hong Kong should 
be elected immediately in 1997.137 
 On December 19, 1984, Thatcher and Zhao Ziyang signed the Sino-British Joint 
Declaration that laid out the terms of the negotiations on Hong Kong’s political future. Local 
reactions to the Joint Declaration were mixed. Consistent with earlier opinion polls, most people 
preferred that Hong Kong remain a British colony. Although some feared the prospect of living 
under Chinese rule, they were glad that a deal had finally been reached and recognized that 
continued British rule was unrealistic. The declaration, as defined by Cradock, was said to be “as 
comprehensive protection as could be devised and agreed”138 and it offered different advantages 
to both Britain and China. For the PRC government, the Joint Declaration was a way to prepare 
Hong Kong for eventual reunification as smoothly as possible and to assure Hong Kong people 
that their way of life would not change. Still, many people in Hong Kong were frustrated, and 
they resented the way that the negotiations had been conducted because they determined they did 
not have any say in the process. For the British, the Joint Declaration was an attempt to protect 
Hong Kong after 1997 and to withdraw with dignity without appearing as if they had surrendered 
Hong Kong and betrayed its people. This explains why Britain sought to include the voices of 
the Hong Kong Executive Counsel and introduce greater democratic institutions into Hong Kong 
throughout the Sino-British negotiations. 
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CONCLUSION 
In 1979, British officials kickstarted discussions on Hong Kong’s future with China and 
had high hopes of an outcome that maintained British administration of both the ceded and 
leased territories. International law guaranteed Britain’s sovereign rights over Hong Kong Island 
and the Kowloon Peninsula, and British administration established rule of law institutions, an 
internationally accepted currency and attractive free-market economy, which spurred enormous 
economic investment. However, by 1984 Britain ultimately made a concession on Hong Kong 
sovereignty after overestimating the relative strength of the legal and economic leverage they 
had over China. Several factors led Britain to cede sovereignty of Hong Kong Island and 
Kowloon Peninsula, two territories otherwise guaranteed to them indefinitely, and these 
included: the expiration of the New Territories Lease, the necessity of managing Hong Kong as 
one entity, China’s absolute commitment to regaining sovereignty of Hong Kong at any cost and 
Britain’s desire to maintain Hong Kong’s economic vitality.  
A comparison of Britain and China’s goals at the beginning of the negotiations to the 
outcomes both sides achieved by 1984, offers an entry point to assess the relative success of the 
negotiation outcome for Britain. When Edward Heath visited Deng Xiaoping in 1982, China 
communicated their committment to regaining sovereignty and administration over the whole of 
Hong Kong and envisaged an outcome after 1997 where Hong Kong transitioned to a Special 
Administrative Region (SAR) with a high degree of autonomy under a “one-country, two 
systems” model.139 In contrast, British officials desired an outcome in 1982 that allowed Britain 
to continue to exercise full control of domestic and external affairs in Hong Kong after the New 
Territories lease expired. By 1984, the terms in the Sino-British Joint Declaration bore a 
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striking—almost exact—resemblance to China’s stated aims in 1982. Therefore, when analyzing 
the relative success of this outcome for Britain, at face value the negotiations read as a story of 
British capitulation and possible failure.  
However, while it is true that Britain made a series of major concessions, chief among 
them was ceding sovereignty of Hong Kong Island and the Kowloon Peninsula back to China 
and withdrawing permanently from Hong Kong, this result drew in large part from China’s 
commitment to take Hong Kong at any cost. China’s commitment to reunification placed 
considerable constraints on the British negotiating team because China’s demands were 
essentially non-negotiable.  
Though both Hong Kong and China stood much to gain economically from continued 
British administration, Britain overlooked the central importance China placed on reclaiming 
Hong Kong to their nationalist, political identity. Under the leadership of Deng Xiaoping, China 
resolved that, if the PRC’s resumption of sovereignty over Hong Kong brought economic 
collapse to Hong Kong, then the PRC “would courageously face up to this catastrophe.”140 
China’s sovereignty-at-any-cost approach combined with the fact that Hong Kong was only 
economically and politically viable as one entity, meant that Britain’s legal claims to the ceded 
territories of Hong Kong Island and the Kowloon Peninsula were powerless in practice. Britain 
determined that if they held on to just the ceded territories, it would be the Hong Kong people 
who would suffer as the ceded territories could not meet their basic food, water or power needs. 
Furthermore, structural interdependency and near-total economic integration of the ceded and 
leased territories meant that any partition to Hong Kong would carry severe economic 
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consequences. Britain, thus, traded its prestige and legal rights in Hong Kong to maintain Hong 
Kong’s economic viability. Therefore, given China’s constraints, achieved the Britain best deal 
they could and accusations in the existing literature of British cowardice or betrayal are 
unfounded. 
While journalists such as Mark Roberti argue that Britain betrayed the people of Hong 
Kong, it was the Chinese who barred Hong Kong people and Hong Kong administrators from the 
negotiations. China was fiercely opposed to Britain’s aim to secure a solution that was 
acceptable to the Hong Kong people because it implied a trilateral negotiation involving China, 
Hong Kong and Britain. When Lord Belstead suggested this approach in 1982 through his 
metaphor of the three-legged stool, Chinese leaders rejected it outright. As far as China was 
concerned, the Hong Kong negotiations were a bilateral “problem left over from history141” that 
called for the removal of a foreign government that ruled over ethnic Chinese on Chinese soil.  
Moreover, when the Hong Kong Governor, Edward Youde, became a negotiator in mid-
1983 he told journalists that he was representing Hong Kong at the negotiating table. In 
response, the Xinhua News Agency, a Chinese newspaper, replied, “Mr. Youde is a member of 
the British delegation. Only the Chinese government can represent the people of Hong Kong.”142 
This crucial exchange reveals an important dimension to the negotiations. Specifically, it 
demonstrates that both Britain and China considered themselves to be representing the Hong 
Kong people even though the Hong Kong people were not allowed to take part in negotiations 
and had no elected voice to speak for them. 
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In the context of China’s refusal to grant the Hong Kong people a right to participate in 
the negotiations, Britain advocated for an acceptable solution. While Roberti argues that Britain 
did not consult the people of Hong Kong nor take their wishes into account, public opinion data 
reveals that Britain advocated for the same outcomes that most Hong Kong people wanted, 
specifically, British administration. More significantly, Roberti’s argument denies the agency 
Hong Kong people exercised even under China’s constraints to involve themselves in internal 
debates and play a significant role in working out Britain’s policy.143 In particular, members of 
LEGCO consulted with British officials on how to best negotiate with China and on what terms.  
 Throughout the negotiations, British officials responded to unexpected Chinese 
constraints on Hong Kong’s future. While Britain miscalculated the strength of their negotiating 
leverage by failing to consider the symbolic value of Hong Kong’s reunification to China, they 
did achieve an outcome that allowed the Hong Kong people to administer Hong Kong for fifty 
years with assurances from China that they would not interfere in Hong Kong judicial or 
administrative processes. As we anticipate the end of the terms of the Sino-British Joint 
Declaration in 2047, only time will tell if the difficult questions of Hong Kong sovereignty, 
administration and economic prosperity that fueled the 1982-1984 Sino-British negotiations will 
reemerge.   
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